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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the ways of thinking God in contemporary philosophy is reflecting on violence. In fact, 
reflecting on violence implies always at the same time to refer to the difficulty of thinking about the 
co-implication of law and violence, a typical prerogative of divine action. From this perspective, 
political theology is concerned with the status and the possibilities or impossibilities of representing 
violence in a given political order. Three are the classical texts in the backdrop of this reflection on 
the hiatus between law and violence: Walter Benjamin Critique of Violence of 1921, Carl Schmitt’s 
Political Theology of 1922 and Derrida’s Force of Law of 1989. The article examines another para-
digm, that of Ernesto Laclau. The article concludes that only a non-presentable idea of God as a 
negative fundament allows for a non-authoritarian political idea. But this non-presentable character 
is only made possible by revolutionary politics. 
 
Keywords: Political Theology; Anti-fundationalism; Revolutionary Politics; Violence; Laclau. 
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1. DIVINE VIOLENCE: THE BACKDROP OF REVOLUTIONARY 
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
One of the ways of thinking God in contemporary philosophy is reflecting on 
violence. In fact, reflecting on violence implies always at the same time to refer 
to the difficulty of thinking about the co-implication of law and violence, a typi-
cal prerogative of divine action. From this perspective, political theology is con-
cerned with the status and the possibilities or impossibilities of representing vio-
lence in a given political order. 
“Pure violence” is as impossible for a political community as an “unthreat-
ened peace.” Absolute order and pure violence relate to each other as a “coinci-
dentia oppositorum,” using an expression of Nicolas de Cusa. In fact, Nicolas de 
Cusa considered the complexion of the opposites as the most perfect definition 
of God.
1
 
Given this opposition, every “representational violence” is nothing more 
than a “forced mediation,” an impersonation of God in political reality, a way of 
occupying the “empty throne” -in Agamben’s words
2
- or “empty place” -in 
Lefort’s words
3
- or a way to exercise “fetishism” in Benjamin’s perspective. 
Since God is non-presentable, he cannot be represented in the political commu-
nity. 
Three are the classical texts in the backdrop of this reflection on the hiatus 
between law and violence: Walter Benjamin Critique of Violence of 1921, Carl 
Schmitt’s Political Theology of 1922 and Derrida’s Force of Law of 1989. The 
reason for the sovereignty in Schmitt's discourse is precisely the mediation be-
tween violence and order. Schmitt himself recognizes the hiatus that exists be-
tween both moments and, consequently, the "decisionism" implicit in the passage 
-------------------------------------------- 
1 True opposites are never incommensurable. If they were, the relation of opposition could 
not unite them. His use of that expression implies that opposites always occur together; they can 
not be taken apart from each other and they define each other. About this expression in post-
modernity see Greer 2003, 235-236. About this expression in relationship with negative theology 
see Franke 2014, 57: “The apophatic is the locus par excellence of complete contradiction and 
paradox, of coincidentia oppositorum in a language given currency by Cusanus. Might we, then, 
envisage an asymptotic point of “indiscretion” at which all such alternatives collapse together 
and cannot be dissevered or even discerned from one another? Meister Eckhart teaches that noth-
ing can be compared to God because nothing is distinct from him. Absolute distance and no dis-
tance at all alike prevent any sort of articulation.” 
2 Agamben 2011. 
3 Lefort 2006, 148-187. 
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of the exception to the norm. Precisely for this reason, the sovereign power be-
comes the true foundation of political reality. Benjamin and Derrida also show 
the need to preserve the hiatus between the two opposites. Derrida reveals, how-
ever, the unreason of any appearance of foundation. Benjamin criticizes the idol-
atry implicit in every imposition of a sovereign power. 
In Schmitt’s Political Theology violence first takes the form of an excep-
tion, an event characterized by anomia, absence of norm and absence of normal 
order, hence absence of law and presence of conflict –of an antagonism between 
“friends and enemies.” In this situation, violence acquires the form of a decision 
on the exception to bring an end with it and to restore legal order. In this restora-
tion lies the legitimacy of the political decision. Every legal order can be seen as 
institutionalized violence; that is, every juridical order is always sustained by vi-
olence. The decision on the exception that produces order is comparable to a mir-
acle and the sovereign to God. Here begins the core of the Schmittian reflection 
on “political theology.”
4
 
Benjamin’s main objective in Critique of Violence was to destruct the per-
vasive circle around means and ends, following which the ends are just if they 
can be achieved by just means; the means are just if they aim toward just ends. 
Violence is an unjustified mean. There is no reasonable justification for it, even 
not to construct an order. The distinction between sanctioned and unsanctioned 
violence shadows this idea. Benjamin insists through many examples -such as 
the right to conduct warfare, and the right to strike- on saying that sanctioned 
violence is violence and we must be critical of it.
5
 In fact, representational vio-
lence as legal violence shadows the possibility of thinking radically about the 
legitimacy of violence. Judging the legitimacy or illegitimacy of violence belongs 
to a philosophy of history. The sphere of justice is related to violence as an end 
in a very different kind of reflection. Benjamin is fighting against the idolatries 
of power that seem to act in the name of God. However, the only way in which 
God make his appearance is through divine violence. For Benjamin, the only po-
litical violence that can be considered similar to divine violence is revolutionary 
violence, a revolutionary action that produces continually adjustments without a 
utopian end.
6
 
-------------------------------------------- 
4 Begins here but goes far beyond that. See Herrero 2015 and Herrero 2017, 23-43. Also, 
Vatter 2017, 245-269. 
5 In his view, there is a sphere of human agreement that is nonviolent to the extent that it 
is wholly inaccessible to violence: the sphere proper to “understanding,” that is, language. Only 
of late, and in a peculiar process of decay, has legal violence penetrated it with the penalty placed 
on fraud. Like if we could distinguish between sanctioned and unsanctioned language. Benjamin 
1986, 289. 
6 Martel 2012 puts the accent in anarchism not in revolution as for example makes Eagle-
ton 1981. Anarchism is for Martel the kind of politics that emerges from Benjamin’s negative 
theology consisting in a “Messianism in which the Messiah does virtually nothing except make 
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Derrida’s reflection is in a way more focused on the performative aspect of 
violence. He introduces the idea that law is an authorized force. Violence then is 
at the core of the idea of law, even if justice can never be as such institutionally 
represented. Every law turns injustice into justice and, in this sense, can be con-
sidered violent. At their origin, violence and order are indistinguishable: primary 
violence is also primary justice. But justice is undecidable, absolute alterity, and 
not presentable. There is something mystical in that origin, while law preserves 
traces of it. Since justice is undecidable, each position of law violates justice (like 
a second violence). 
In spite of that, a close reading of Derrida’s First Name of Benjamin points 
to the necessary existence of a kind of coupling between foundational violence 
and representational violence. Foundational violence is somehow always within 
the law. The law is threatened from within
7
 insofar as it cannot be more than a 
law to come. At first, this violence is exercised as a right to interpret the instituted 
law, that is, a right to establish guidelines for reading the state’s rules. Following 
this argument, Derrida deconstructs Benjamin’s text and suggests that founda-
tional violence (rechtssetzende Gewalt) already implies conservative violence 
(rechtserhaltende Gewalt) and cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of 
foundational violence, which grounds that which has to be preserved, that which 
has to be iterated in order to remain. The distinction between these two kinds of 
violence is complicated by the paradox of iterability (which is inextricable from 
the idea of time). Derrida speaks of a “différentielle contamination” instead of 
coincidentia oppositorum. There is always a constitutive “abnormality” within 
-------------------------------------------- 
it possible for us not to be determined by its own fetishism (…) the idea of divine violence puts 
the entire onus of action and responsibility on human beings.” Martel 2012,132. Conversely, Ea-
gleton says (Eagleton 1982, 115): “Benjamin's Messianism is at once the clearest evidence of his 
idealism and one of the most powerful sources of his revolutionary thought.” Also Eagleton 
(1982, 132): “Social democracy and ultra-leftism (anarchism, adventurism, putschism and so on) 
are among other things antithetical responses to the failure or absence of a mass revolutionary 
movement.” Eagleton 1982, 148: “Benjamin's negative theology, like much of the negativity of 
Western Marxism, has its historical roots in an absence rather more determinate than that of the 
Messiah: the absence of the revolutionary party.” Eagleton 1982, 177: “The surrealists, Benjamin 
writes, perceived an ecstatic or anarchic component in every revolutionary act; but, he quickly 
adds, 'to place the accent exclusively on it would be to subordinate the methodical and discipli-
nary preparation for revolution entirely to a praxis oscillating between fitness exercises and cel-
ebration in advance' (“Surrealism”) Precisely such a subordination scars Benjamin's own work, 
all the way from the spasmodic Sorelian violence espoused in his early ultra-leftist apocalypticism 
to the revolutionary Messianism and political poetry of the Theses themselves.” 
7 Here is the difference not only with Benjamin, but also with Carl Schmitt. What threatens 
law does not belong already to law, because it is an exception, a rupture of law coming from “the 
real”: the event in history. In this point Schmitt is closer to Benjamin; but differentiates from him 
in so far for Schmitt the decision taken in this exception is looking for an order to come that in a 
way is already prefigured in reality, while for Benjamin constitutive violence implies an absolute 
rupture thought as an absolute disorder. For an approach to Derrida reading of Benjamin on this 
topic see Biset 2013, 107-130. 
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the sphere of law that can be shown to constitute revolution— a menace that is 
not exterior to the law and that can only be thought of as a destiny. 
He had already offered some thoughts on violence in Of Grammatology, 
when he referred to “the violence of the letter” in chapter one of the second part. 
He asks what links writing to violence and answers, “the present, living, con-
scious representation of a text within the experience of the person who writes or 
reads it, and if the text constantly goes beyond this representation by the entire 
system of its resources and its own laws, then the question of genealogy exceeds 
by far the possibilities that are at present given for its elaboration.”
8
 This dis-
course is an endless interweaving of roots, a “system of roots.” In his commentary 
to Levi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques, Derrida speaks of three aspects related to 
violence and language. In the Nambikwara language, proper names are forbid-
den. When the anthropologist reveals those names outside of the community, vi-
olence erupts. 
To start, there is a first violence to be identified. It corresponds to the act 
of naming, which results in names that will on occasion be forbidden to pro-
nounce. This is the original violence of language, which consists in inscribing 
with difference, in classifying, in conceptualizing what is unique within a system 
and inscribing it there. This is the gesture of “arche-writing.”
9
 A second kind of 
violence appears as reparatory, and prescribes the concealment of writing and the 
effacement of the so-called proper name. This violence urges the “moral.” A third 
kind of violence can emerge as an empirical possibility and is commonly called 
war or evil. It consists in revealing by effraction the so-called proper name. This 
violence is more complex because it refers at the same time to the two inferior 
levels of arche-violence and of law.
10
 In the very context of language, we find 
violence structured on three levels: (1) structural violence that is (2) violently 
suppressed through the institution of law, which is itself (3) broken by the emer-
gence of empirical violence. 
This characterization of violence follows in Of Grammatology from the ex-
position of Lévi-Strauss’ analysis of the oppressive character of writing: for him, 
the passage from speech to writing is a leap, like the instantaneous crossing of a 
line of discontinuity. It is a passage from a fully oral language, free from all writ-
ing and pure and innocent, to a language that includes accessory graphic repre-
sentation, which opens up a technique of oppression. Derrida criticizes the polit-
ical idea underlying Lévi-Strauss’ description by saying that his reflection is an 
-------------------------------------------- 
8 Derrida 1997, 101. 
9 Derrida, 1997, 112. 
10 Derrida, 1997, 112. 
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anarchism that deliberately confounds law and oppression. Lévi-Strauss de-
scribes the idea of law and positive right as constraint and enslavement. Hence, 
political power can only be the custodian of an unjust power.
11
 
Derrida views things differently when he writes, “to recognize writing in 
speech, that is to say difference and the absence of speech, is to begin to think 
the lure. There is no ethics without the presence of the other but also, and conse-
quently, without absence, dissimulation, detour, difference, writing. The arche-
writing is the origin of morality as of immorality. The non-ethical opening of 
ethics. A violent opening. As in the case of the vulgar concept of writing, the 
ethical instance of violence must be rigorously suspended in order to repeat the 
genealogy of morals.”
12
 
In sum, every linguistic representation is already a violation, but this vio-
lation can only be thought of within morality and vice-versa. Again, there is a 
kind of contamination between speech and writing. 
Laclau’s approach seems to be a variation on this same idea, even if vio-
lence is not a signifier within his repertoire. As Julie Drew stresses, the radical 
democratic agenda of Laclau can’t be advanced without “discursive force.” In 
fact, she critically asserts that for Laclau violence is a necessary and not neces-
sarily undesirable function of freedom within the social.
13
 
 
2. LACLAU’S RHETORICAL FOUNDATION OF SOCIETY 
Laclau completely assumes the linguistic turn that Wittgenstein and Saussure in-
troduced while updating the Marxist and Gramscian tradition with some La-
canian elements. It is difficult to know how much of what I have called here the 
backdrop's authors influenced him, but it is safe to guess that at least Schmitt 
(never being quoted) had some influence, even though Laclau seems to be more 
attached to Lefort’s theological -political approach.
14
 In any case, Laclau is deal-
ing with the same theo- political question we have already referred to: the non-
appearance of God as the source of a post-foundational political thinking that 
installs violence in the center of political community. The empty space of power 
-------------------------------------------- 
11 Derrida, 1997, 131. 
12 Derrida, 1997, 140. 
13 She quotes an interview where Laclau affirms: “Making decisions and establishing re-
lations of power necessarily go together. I would argue that this is not bad. This is violence, 
power, but it is not bad.” Drew 1999, 292-97, 294. 
14 Andrew Arato affirms that Laclau’s thesis are almost disguised Schmittian ones and not 
Lefort’s ones. See Arato 2013, 156: “The stress on symbolic representation is a return to Schmitt. 
Above all, Laclau’s populism involves the extrication of the people from the empirical people by 
an evidently plebiscitarian form of leadership.” The same Laclau takes distance from Lefort’s 
thesis. See Gold 2014 57-76. 
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let opened by God -a transcendence without transcendent body- enables the sym-
bolic establishment of the division and contestation rather than absence of vio-
lence. Revolutionary violence is the core of the political. 
Laclau tries to construct a political ontology able to respond to the chal-
lenges of the present time. He reflects on violence within the sphere of language. 
In Derrida’s account, language is the sphere in which violence manifests in the 
first place; in Benjamin’s approach the same sphere is originally free from vio-
lence. Laclau’s post-structuralist position, underlies the impossibility of closing 
any linguistic context, and consequently any social context, as a unified whole. 
Society is ontologically impossible. In fact, this is the title of one of his first arti-
cles: “The impossibility of society.”
15
 This article was first published in 1983 and 
in Marchart’s opinion, in it Laclau’s whole enterprise is formulated in nuce.
16
 
What we can find are marginal processes, which constantly disrupt meaning and 
do not lead to the closure of society around a single matrix. Because of that he 
likes to speak of “the social” instead of “society.” The impossibility of society is 
a productive one: since allows multiple ways of institutionalising it. In his ontol-
ogy, “the political” is central in the process of instituting society.
17
 Following 
Althusser, he thinks that no social system can be closed on itself. Moreover, pre-
cisely the idea of a complete closure represents the extreme idea of non-acknowl-
edgement (just like representational violence does).
18
 Political action consists 
mainly in achieving a totalizing meaning, actively constructed, based on hetero-
geneous elements. Political discourse is the main place where the whole of soci-
ety is articulated. Every discourse is a “force mediation” in the sense we have 
already spoke about. 
Contrary to the classical idea of emancipation, which depends upon the 
possibility of imagining a system for society in which acknowledgment cannot 
be absent, the political discursive construction is a process of emancipation inso-
far as it aims to always “reactivate” as necessary the sedimented meanings that 
society shares: emancipation is understood here as a transformation from neces-
sity into contingency through re- signification of shared meanings. Re-significa-
tion is the active non-definitive-closure of a given discourse or a non-definitive-
installation of every “representative violence.” Hence, there must be a dialectical 
relationship between closure—that is, the auto-reproduction of social relations—
-------------------------------------------- 
15 Laclau 1914a, 122–122. 
16 Marchart 2007, stresses this aspect in the theoretical enterprise of Laclau: the intention 
of reversing the order of priority between the social and the political against a real current coming 
from the Weberian rationalization process prophecy, following which society will be progres-
sively bureaucratized. He is in the same side as Schmitt, from who comes the distinction from 
politics and the political in The Concept of the Political. 
17 Laclau, 2014b, 7: “privileged ontological place.” 
18 Laclau’s perspective is not compatible with politics of identity, since identities are al-
ways constructed, dislocated, contested. 
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and the necessary form of dis-closure or non-acknowledgement. This distortion 
is constitutive of every social relationship. 
In any case, for instituting society, projecting the illusion of plenitude and 
self-transparency onto something that is essentially divided is necessary. In this 
sense, society cannot be otherwise than a symbolic space. Laclau, using the word 
“hegemony” and taking the expression from Gramsci, designates the process of 
instituting society by creating this always-distorted symbolic scenario.
19
 
The principal tool for constructing hegemony is “discourse.” Inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s approach, Laclau describes a substantive link between word and 
agency. In fact, for him, there is no extra-discursive point of view. Discourse is 
constitutive of society because without a fictive fixation of meanings no meaning 
would exist at all. That is, there is no primary or original meaning. To create such 
meaning, discourse operates following the logic of equivalence and substitution. 
When dealing with an impossible object, the discourse that has to shape it cannot 
be an auto-transparent medium. 
The logic of equivalence acts by destroying the meaning of a word by pro-
liferating equivalent words. Laclau presented the example of welfare, which is 
understood as identical to nourishment, health, education, etc. The more the 
equivalence chain extends, the more meaning the main signifier loses, but, at the 
same time, in the political sphere, it gains a hegemonic capacity. In this case, 
Laclau speaks of “empty signifiers.” When a noun that is not the main signifier 
is in an equivalence chain, every particular noun begins to mean something more 
than before, something related with a universal discourse.
20
 Regarding this effect, 
Laclau speaks of “floating signifiers.” It is impossible to achieve universality by 
any means other than starting from particularity. 
He alludes to mystical language to found the idea of equivalence. It is 
proper to religious language. In fact, to speak about God, who is inexpressible, 
we can only enumerate some of his attributes. This enumeration does not really 
enrich our knowledge of God, but rather iterates God’s same name referring to a 
-------------------------------------------- 
19 There are two different moments in Laclau’s political analysis: hegemony and populism, 
which are related to each other in a way that can be intertwined with sanctioned violence and 
foundational violence. These two moments of “the political” exclude and depend upon one an-
other. Strictly considered, for Laclau, the populist moment alone is political, while the hegemonic 
moment is properly apolitical. In a way, this distinction replicates the Husserlian distinction be-
tween “sedimentation” and “reactivation,” as he recognizes. Laclau 2014b, 4: “For Husserl, the 
reactivating process leads to a transcendental subject that is the absolute source of meaning; for 
me, it leads to an instance of radical contingency in which many other decisions could have been 
taken.” For him, even if he does not would say perhaps in this way, populism is in itself the only 
possible critique of violence and the only possible path to emancipation. 
20 He speaks of weakened universalization. Laclau is looking for a universalism that is 
compatible with difference, since he recognizes that universality is necessary in order to achieve 
some kind of unity without which hegemony would not be possible. 
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particular aspect.
21
 Moreover, each term in the chain could be substituted by 
every other term because every part of the chain expresses the same meaning: 
ineffability. Language is distorted in order to express the ineffable. This is the 
case in authors like Gershom Sholem, Meister Eckhart and Dionysius the Areop-
agite. 
The case of God’s inefallibility has the same structure, as revolutionary 
will. Since it is inexpressible, every discourse aiming to construct it has to exhibit 
the same kind of negative approach. In fact, Laclau thinks that the metaphysics 
of the ineffable God underlays the ontology of the political on which his populist 
approach is based. This “discursive metaphysic” is one in which every absolute 
transcendence remains undetermined because a realm beyond differences and 
particularities that avoids particularity and difference does not exist. Hence, tran-
scendence is always contaminated by finitude and immanence. There is no place 
beyond differences that is not “ancillary to an operation of reintroducing differ-
ences.”
22
 The only way of let God appear is to maintain the non-closure through 
re-signification. 
Laclau’s “hegemonical” operation is an expression of this ontological 
background. He defines it saying, “[I understand by hegemony] a relationship by 
which a particular content assumes, in a certain context, the function of incarnat-
ing an absent fullness.”
23
 
Marchart points out commenting this ontological aspect that Laclau do not 
propose an anti-foundationalist theory but a post-foundationalist one, “since the 
dimension of ground does not disappear without a trace, but rather serves, 
through its very absence, as ‘negative’ foundation which must remain present.”
24
 
The difference between mystical language and hegemony is found in that, 
while the content of the name of God remains empty, the “order” that hegemony 
represents – which from an ontological perspective cannot be determined, but, on 
the contrary, is the non-order– has to be determined: hegemonic practice makes 
for particular differential content in the name of plenitude. Here begins the rep-
resentational violence produced through discourse. Laclau does not speak as such 
of violence, but he is clear that the hegemonic movement as such imposes “struc-
tural distortion” on society in a particular historical moment. Hegemony makes 
the same movement in Eckhart when he “deificates” the concrete, whose ground 
-------------------------------------------- 
21 Laclau 2014b, 26. 
22 Laclau 2014b, 48: “In this way mystical discourse reveals something belonging to the 
general structure of experience: not only the separation between the two extremes of radical 
finitude and absolute fullness, but also the complex language games that it is possible to play on 
the basis of the contamination of each of them by the other.” 
23 Laclau 2014b, 48. For example in a society suffering deep social disorganization, order 
can be seen as the positive reverse of a situation of generalized anomie. 
24 Marchart 2007, 137. 
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is contingency itself.
25
 The fact that there is no guide for imposing that particular 
content in its fullness is simply called finitude. The ethical perspective depends 
on keeping the two sides of the paradox alive: an absolute that can be realized in 
a lesser form of being, and a particularity that has to incarnate a plenitude that it 
does not have.
26
 
 
3. THE SYMBOLIC APPROPRIATION OF “THE EMPTY SIGNIFIER” 
The question of how to make hegemony possible is equivalent to the question of 
how to construct a unified discursive space. In this case, Laclau takes from Ro-
man Jakobson’s “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturb-
ance”
27
 the idea that any linguistic sign presupposes its arrangement through two 
different operations: first of all, combination and contexture, whereby a sign ac-
quires its location in an orderly succession with other signs and, secondly, selec-
tion and substitution, whereby a sign can be replaced by others in any given struc-
tural location. This corresponds with Saussurean’s distinction between the syn-
tagmatic and the paradigmatic. Combination and substitution are the two move-
ments that regulate the relationship between signs. 
Jakobson moves from the syntactical field to the rhetorical one and identi-
fies a similar relationship between metonymy, which corresponds to combina-
tion, and metaphor, which corresponds to substitution. 
Laclau finds that they are not completely different from one another. More-
over, he thinks of contiguity and analogy as opposite poles on a continuum. Both 
are transgressions of the differential logic associated with the syntagmatic axis 
of the signifying system. In fact, we commonly substitute (metaphorically, ana-
logically) meanings that we normally see close together (metonymically, contex-
tually). 
-------------------------------------------- 
25 Laclau 2014b, 50. 
26 Laclau 2014b, 51: “If there was an aprioristic logic linking the experience of the absolute 
to particular contexts, the link between the incarnated absolute and its incarnating contents would 
have become a necessary one, and the absolute would have lost its dimension of beyond. In that 
case we would be able to name God in a direct way, or at least to claim to have a discursive 
mastery of His essence, as Hegel did in his Logic. To claim the opposite does not mean that any 
content, at any moment, can be an equal candidate for the incarnation of the absolute. This is only 
true sub species aeternitatis. But historical life takes place in a terrain that is less than eternity. If 
the experience of what I have referred to in terms of the dual movement ‘materialization of 
God’/’deification of the concrete’ is going to live up to its two sides, neither the absolute nor the 
particular can find a final peace with the other. This means that the construction of an ethical life 
will depend on keeping open the two sides of this paradox: an absolute that can only be actualized 
by being something less than itself, and a particularity whose only destiny is to be the incarnation 
of a ‘sublimity’ transcending its own body.” 
27 Jakobson 1958. 
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These two tropes are the matrix and all the rest can be reduced to them. 
They are instruments for creating meaning. There are no rules for construction 
since a rhetorical zero degree does not exist where we can affirm that rhetoricity 
is inherent in signification; or, what is the same, “without a tropological displace-
ment, signification could not find its own ground.”
28
 Laclau affirms that dis-
course “is equivalent to the social production of meaning –that is, to the very 
fabric of social life.”
29
 
In order to achieve unified signification, these two strategies have to be 
combined with the strategic movement of discursive closure. Following the on-
tology described above, closure implies being able to name beyond the discursive 
space. This is the role of the “empty signifier” (for example, Sorel’s general 
strike). This empty signifier is not a name that actually comes from beyond, but 
rather a particular name that acts at the same time as particular and as universal. 
It is a particular signifier that, in being displaced, signifies a totality and it con-
stitutes the dual role that is at the root of every tropological displacement. 
If hegemony consists in constructing representational violence, the only 
possible critique of violence is another movement, which is complementary to 
the hegemonic one. De-politization and re-politization characterize the dual as-
pects of the political sphere: decision and violence, representational violence and 
foundational violence. 
The only way to redefine a political position that subverts a given hege-
monic space is through a new rhetorical intervention. In fact, hegemony supposes 
a peaceful order in which meanings are sedimented. Once established, hegemony 
becomes an institutionalized order that functions in an un-politicized and admin-
istrative way. The prevalent discourse therein corresponds to a syntagmatic dis-
course organized around differential positions (differential logic); this kind of 
social order is referred to as pluralism. 
But, since distortion is original, every hegemonic order is in some way op-
pressive insofar as it shadows the constitutive non-presence of God by its pres-
ence. It follows that every hegemonic order is destined to be subverted. Rhetori-
cal intervention consists then in creating a unified discursive space that is capable 
of dividing differential pluralist space into two discursive positions: us and them. 
To achieve this polarization, discourse has to locate all social elements around 
one of these two poles in order to construct an identity. The internal components 
of this discourse are related through equivalence, which is constructed at the sys-
tem’s suture point. Laclau explains the construction of discourse as follows: 
-------------------------------------------- 
28 Laclau 2014b, 63. 
29 Laclau 2014b, 65. 
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“Given that the equivalential chain establishes paratactic succession 
between its component links, none of them can have a position of central-
ity founded in a combinatorial logic of a hypotactic nature. So, if the unity 
of the equivalential chain is going to be organized around a privileged 
signifier, such a privileged cannot be derived from a differential structural 
position, but only from a cathectic investment of a radical kind.”
30
 
Since 1789, this rhetorical intervention has been made in the name of “the 
people.” In fact, “the political operation par excellence is always going to be the 
construction of a people.”
31
 The people seem to be the political subject in 
Laclau’s view. 
The idea of the reactivation of the sedimented meanings can only be 
thought with two conditions: a temporization of the discursive space in which 
there is a de-fixation of meanings, and someone or something that can re-articu-
late new meanings. Event is the name of an occurrence from “outside” that dis-
turbs, dislocates or interrupts the discursive space. This event is thought politi-
cally as an antagonism. The subject that carries out the antagonisms and that is at 
the same time constructed by them is the people. Populism is the name of the 
process of the constitution of the political subject. 
In fact, the construction of a people would be impossible without the oper-
ation of mechanisms of representation.
32
 Identification with an empty signifier is 
the necessary condition for the emergence of a people: from represented to rep-
resentative. The empty signifier cannot be totally autonomous from the equiva-
lential chain; it can, however, function as a point of identification because it rep-
resents an equivalential chain, meaning that the signifier then constitutes the to-
tality: from representative to represented. This dual movement is always in ten-
sion. 
The ontological character of the “representational system” conditions the 
possibility of populism. There is always something completely heterogeneous 
present in any iteration of a system of political signification that does not permit 
its closure
33
 or, what it is the same, that does not permit its complete “represen-
tation.” Representation will always be figurative or rhetorical— and literal terms 
-------------------------------------------- 
30 Laclau 2014b, 68. 
31 Laclau 2005, 153. 
32 Laclau 2005, 161. This idea can only be understood if we take account of the “hetero-
geneity” as primordial and irreducible. Heterogeneity shows in excess. This excess cannot be 
mastered. Heterogeneity means “deficient being” or “failed unicity.” Unicity show itself through 
its very absence (Laclau 2005, 223). “The heterogeneous is what lacks any differential location 
within the symbolic order.” (Laclau 2005, 108). 
33 Laclau 2014b, 84: “The systemacity of a system, its closure –which is the condition of 
signification in a system, such as Saussures’s, whose identities are merely differential –coincides 
with the determination of its limits. These limits however, can only be dictated by something 
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can never substitute figurative ones.
34
 The people has the same characteristics as 
God: is not presentable, is always ab- sent. 
This representation can only be constructed through the articulation of par-
ticular demands.
35
 A group’s unity is simply the result of social demands, which 
can be crystallized in sedimented social practices. For Laclau, the smallest unity 
of analysis is not the group or class, but rather the demand. “Populist reason” is 
a kind of rhetorical intervention that can project a partial demand by embodying 
the absent fullness of the community through a potentially endless chain of equiv-
alences, which constitutes from the plebs (the multitude) the populus (the total-
ity). The “logic” of equivalence is fundamentally related to affective bonds, mak-
ing for an inextricable relationship between signification and affect.
36
 
The populus/plebs relationship becomes the locus of permanent tension in 
which each term at once absorbs and expels the other, a kind of complexio oppo-
sitorum. Precisely this tension constitutes the character of the political because 
the plurality of the populus’ embodiments does not lead to any ultimate reconcil-
iation (that is, overlapping) of the two poles. This is why all partiality contains 
traces of the universal.
37
 This tension must remain, it must not be solved. The gap 
between non- presence and presence should be kept open. 
Populism is not a movement, but rather a kind of logic that allows for a 
rhetorical intervention that constitutes antagonisms and liberates discursive vio-
lence found in representational hegemony.
38
 Antagonisms are not objective rela-
tionships, but rather reveal the limits that society encounters in constituting itself 
as an objective order.
39
 All antagonism is essentially political.
40
 Naming is the 
-------------------------------------------- 
beyond them. But, as the system is a system of differences –of all actual differences- that ‘be-
yond’, which should be heterogeneous with the system in order to fulfil its function of truly clos-
ing it, lacks the condition of a true heterogeneity if it consists in one more difference. The latter 
would be, in some way undecided, suspended between being internal and external to the system.” 
Laclau 2005, 163: “Constructing a people is not simply the application to a particular case of a 
general theory of representation which could be formalized at a more abstract level; it is, on the 
contrary, a paradigmatic case, because it is the one which reveals representation for what it is: the 
primary terrain of constitution of social objectivity.” 
34 Laclau 2014b, 123: “This mean that the representation of the presence of an absence 
which, as we have seen, is a requirement for the apprehension of social antagonisms, will be 
essentially catachrestical.” 123. 
35 He distinguishes between democratic demands and populist demands. A democratic 
demand is a demand that remains isolated. A popular demand is a demand that immediately enters 
in connection with all the equivalential chain. 
36 Laclau 2005, 228. 
37 Laclau 2005, 225. 
38 Laclau 2005, 117. 
39 Laclau 2014, 113. 
40 Laclau 2005, 231. 
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key moment in the constitution of a people.
41
 Derrida would say that it is a soci-
ety’s foundational violence. 
Following this perspective, political history is a “discontinuous succession 
of hegemonic formations that cannot be ordered by a script transcending their 
contingent historicity. ‘Peoples’ are real social formations, but they resist inscrip-
tion into any kind of Hegelian teleology.”
42
 In fact, a people’s boundaries are just 
equivalential components that fluctuate permanently.
43
 
In any case, it seems that Laclau’s rhetorical operation remains necessary 
for weakly constituted identities whose constitution precisely requires represen-
tation in the first place. In a situation of radical disorder, some kind of order is 
needed, and the more generalized the disorder is, the less important the ontic 
content of that which restores order becomes. That ontic content is invested with 
the ontological value of representing order as such.
44
 Laclau in fact recognizes 
historical conditions that make the emergence of constructed popular identities 
possible, pointing specifically to the multiplication of social demands, the radical 
heterogeneity of population, and, finally, globalized capitalism. 
 
4. CONCLUSION: THE NON-PRESENTABLE GOD AND 
REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
In the post-structuralist and post-foundational paradigm, violence is not an epi-
phenomenon of politics. Moreover, the most oppressive political practice would 
be to avoid violence definitively through the construction of a complete closed 
system of society. And this is so, in Laclau's opinion, not only for empirical rea-
sons, but for ontological and theological reasons. 
Laclau's theory of discourse is a general theory of the production of mean-
ing. In fact, what develops in Laclau is a transcendental argument as regards the 
possibility of meaning as such, namely: for a certain degree of meaning to emerge 
a certain degree of systematicity is necessary. But the systematicity that can be 
achieved is always the result of the position of an exclusionary limit. Therefore, 
antagonism serves as the basis of the system, while subverting the identity of the 
system. If, together with this, we accept that the category of antagonism is the 
specific category of the political, we can think of the ontology of the meaning of 
Laclau as a political ontology. 
-------------------------------------------- 
41 Laclau 2005, 119. 
42 Laclau 2005, 226. 
43 Laclau 2005, 227: “Whether nationalism, for instance, is going to become a central 
signifier in the constitution of popular identities depends on a contingent history impossible to 
determine though a priori means.” 
44 Laclau 2005, 160. 
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Several statements can be derived from this argument, but two are relevant: 
(1) Since there is no social reality beyond meaning, a theory of signification 
amounts to a theory of all possible being. All being is discursively constructed 
and discourse constitutes the horizon of all being. (2) Since his ontology of mean-
ing is a political ontology, being and power are the same: without power there 
would not be objectivity. Power is productive of being. 
This “political ontology” is a political theology insofar as it is post-founda-
tionalist. It depends on a view of God in which God is not-presentable, and hence 
not-representable. Foundation is negative and because of that every foundational 
movement of the political is violent. One of Schmitt’s main thesis concerning 
political theology says that: “The metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges 
of the world has the same structure as what the world immediately understands 
to be appropriate as a form of its political organization”.
45
 
We can then accept that a non-presentable idea of God as a negative ground 
corresponds with a revolutionary political theology as we have seen for the case 
of Laclau’ revolutionary populism. But we can say the same for Derrida’s “de-
mocracy to come” or for Benjamin’s revolutionary politics. In a way, these po-
litical theologies aim to keep the “throne empty” in every concrete institutional-
ization of a political representation. But for achieving that operation they need 
the revolutionary movement consisting in continually constructing and decon-
structing.
46
 Only then the true non-presentable God makes his “negative appear-
ance.” 
In the case of Schmitt, however, the possibilities for a political theology of 
revolution do not depend on this non-presentable idea of God, but on a particular 
interpretation of the trinitarian dogma.
47
 It is another kind of revolutionary polit-
ical theology. There are even other revolutionary political theologies based on 
radical immanence, such as those of Slavoj Zizek and Antonio Negri, but they 
are of another kind and their image of God is also different.
48
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
45 Schmitt 2005, 46. 
46 It is in this aspect that my interpretation of Laclau differs from that of Arato. Arato 2013, 
158: “Laclau abandons the definition of Lefort concerning democracy as the emptiness of the 
place of power and the process of institutionally securing its emptiness. The political space can 
be and even must be filled, at least “partially” (whatever that means), and emptiness reappears 
only on the ideological level as the “empty signifier” that only superficially—on the level of 
naming—keeps something of Lefort’s conception. The empty signifier’s stress is on unity rather 
than plurality. In all versions it refers to the unification of heterogeneous demands around admit-
tedly vague, symbolic contents that obliquely refer to an utopian condition of total social unity, 
homogeneity, and reconciliation.” 
47 For an account of this possibility see Herrero 2015, 170-171; and Vatter 2019.. 
48 And criticized by the same Laclau. See Laclau 2005, 239 ff. and 242 ff. 
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